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lina Act passed by the 1955 General Assembly.
These amendments,
among other things, take away the obligee's privilege of a questionable
election of laws -8 and provide that the person having legal custody of
a minor may bring suit.29 In the instant case the court said that the
complete answer to the essentially identically worded Arkansas statute
was that ". . . this provision is not in the North Carolina Act." ° The
1955 amendment places the provision in the North Carolina Act and
apparently authorizes suit in the name of the legal custodian or guardian.
With the real party in interest question fairly well settled by statute
and with the finding of a duty to support clearly the concern of the
court in the responding state, the importance of the instant decision
lies in the interpretation of the Act as requiring an obligee to be
residing in the initiating state during the proceedings in the responding state. To avoid undue complication in the administration of the
support funds, to remove a burden on a state no longer interested in
the matter, and to aid in the uniformity of application of the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, it is hoped that other jurisdictions will adopt this interpretation.
JAMES P. CREWS
Eminent Domain-Limited Access Highways
".... I can go no further, Sir; my
old bones ache. Here's a maze trod
indeed through forth-rights and meanders !"
The Tempest, Act III, Sc. III.
Which lament might well be echoed by the puzzled motorist confronted by the clover-leafs, under and overpasses, traffic circles and
other highway engineering stunts that seem to have mushroomed since
the last war. These and other measures have been required by the
great increase of traffic on our highways, which has made necessary a
basic reconsideration of our highway systems.
The desire for increased safety plus a need for more efficient com=1N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 699. See Note, 33 N. C. L. REv. 513, 550 (1955).
The changes made by this act place North Carolina in the group of states
which have adopted the 1952 Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act.

Since a majority of the states and territories have adopted the 1952 Act, reciprocity will be augmented for North Carolina.
28 N. C. Sess. Laws 1955, c. 699,
§ 4. "Duties of support applicable under
this Act are those imposed or imposable under the laws of any state where the
obligor was present during the period or any part of the period for which support
is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding state
during the period for which support is sought until otherwise shown."
29 N. C. Sess. Laws
1955, c. 699, § 6(d). "A complaint on behalf of a minor
obligee may be brought by a person having legal custody of the minor without
appointment as next friend."
"0Mahan v. Read, 240 N. C. 641, 648, 83 S.E. 2d 706, 712 (1954).
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munication between urban areas has given rise to the construction of
what are called variously "Limited Access Highways," or "Freeways."
Basically these are highways to which abutting property owners do
not have their usual "right of egress and ingress,"' but rather are permitted to have access to the highway at designated intersections only,
or to retain their present access, but only at the pleasure of the highway department. Obviously, such highways are designed primarily
for through traffic. It will be the purpose of this note to discuss some
of the various problems that have already arisen and promise to reappear to plague our courts.
When the state condemns land for highways under its power of
eminent domain, the state obtains only an easement of passage, 2 the
owner of the land taken for the public use reserving the fee. 3 Upon
vacation of the highway by the state, the land normally reverts to the
4
owner, discharged of the easement.
Landowners whose tracts abut on the highway have a universally
5
recognized common law easement of access to the abutting highway
'E.g., Calumet Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Chicago et al. v. City of
Chicago et al., 306 Ill. App. 524, 29 N. E. 2d 292 (1940); County Park Commission of Camden Co. v. Kimble, 24 N. J.Super. 221, 93 A. 2d 647 (1952);
Davis v. Alexander, 202 N. C. 130, 162 S.E. 372 (1932) ; In re Appropriation
of Easement for Highway Purposes, - Ohio -, 112 N. E. 2d 411, 415 (1952) ;
City of Norman v. Safeway Stores, 193 Okla. 534, 145 P. 2d 765 (1944) ; Highway
Commission v. Burk et al., 200 Ore. 211, 265 P. 2d 783 (1954) ; 2 Af. LAW OF
PROPERTY 494 (1952); see Notes, 100 A. L. R. 491; 47 A. L. R. 902; 22 A. L. R.
942; 36 IoWA L. REv. 150 (1950).
- Absent an express statutory sanction the state may acquire land for highways by two methods: (1) by voluntary act of owner, and (2) by condemnation. By the former method the state may obtain the fee. By the latter, only
an easement. Barclay v. Howell, 6 Pet. 498 (U. S. 1832) ; Lindel Realty Co.

v. Miller, 2 N. J.Super. 204, 62 A. 2d 817 (1948).
Purvis v. Busey, 260 Ala. 373, 71 So. 2d 18 (1954); People v. Thompson,
43 Cal. 2d 13, 271 P. 2d 507 (1954); Hildebrand v. Telegraph Co., 219 N. C.
402, 14 S. E. 2d 252 (1941) (Telephone Co. not allowed to use highway easement without compensating owner of fee.) ; Davis v. Alexander, 202 N. C. 130,
162 S.E. 372 (1932) ; Brown v. Electric Co., 138 N. C. 533, 51 S.E. 62 (1905) ;
State v. Jesse Hewell, 90 N. C. 705, 706 (1884) (Jesse was released from an
indictment for carrying a concealed weapon in public when it was shown he
was carrying it on a public highway passing over his father's land. Ashe, J.,
found him to be on his own property since the fact that a public road is over
the land does not deprive a man of his freehold in the soil: "his title continues
in the soil, and the public acquires only an easement, that is, a right of passing
and repassing."); Raleigh and Gaston Ry. v. Richard Davis, 19 N. C. 451
(1837) ; Breinig et ux. v. County of Allegheny et al., 332 Pa. 474, 2 A. 2d 842
(1938) (Owner of fee may control use of highway inconsistent with the easement of passage, i.e. continuous parking.) ; Bond v. Green et al., 189 Va. 23,
52 S.E. 2d 169 (1949) ; Dovaston v. Payne, 2 H. B1. 526, 126 E. R. 684 (1795);
2 Amr. LAW OF PROPERTY 482 (1952).
' Bond v. Green et al, supra note 3.
' Cases cited note 1 supra. But cf. Calumet Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n
of Chicago et al. v. City of Chicago et al., 306 I1. App. 524, 29 N. E. 2d 292
(1940). (Where abutting landowner attempted to enjoil construction of a curb
by the city which would necessitate the abutter's customers traveling a circuitous
route to obtain access. The abutter was thrown on his remedy at law, the court
holding the abutter's riahts are subservient to reasonable use of police power
in the interest of public safety.)
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at any and all points. And when the state deprives the owner of abutting land of his access to the highway, extinguishing the easement,'
he is entitled to compensation 7 even if the state has acquired the land
in fee.' This is explained on the basis that the right of access to a
public highway is an incident of ownership of abutting property, 9 and
the taking thereof is, consequently, a "taking of property."' 0 Thus,
where a municipality vacated a street and conveyed it in fee to a
private individual, and "the street . . . [was] necessary to free and
convenient access to the premises of a particular owner, his right to
such use is appurtenant to his premises and cannot be taken without
payment of damages."" The courts, while they require damages when
the abutting owner's right of access is harmed by a re-routing or vacation of the highway,' 2 recognize no vested right in any particular flow
of traffic over the highway, leaving regulation of traffic to the proper
authorities in the exercise of their police power.13 Even when the
E.g., In re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, - Ohio -,
112 N. E. 2d 411, 415 (1952) and cases cited therein.
' Schiefelbein v. U. S., 124 F. 2d 945 (1942); Ridgway v. City of Osceola,
139 Iowa 590, 117 N. W. 974 (1908); Petition of Burnquist, 220 Minn. 48, 19
N. W. 2d 394 (1945) ; Davis v. Alexander, 202 N. C. 130, 162 S. E. 372 (1932) ;
Thomas v. Farrier, 179 Okla. 263, 65 P. 2d 526 (1937) ; Note 36 IowA L. REV.
150 (1950).
. County Park Comm. of Camden Co. v. Kimble, 24 N. J. Super. 221, 93
A. 2d 647 (1952); Highway Commission v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P. 2d 783
(1954).
'Lindel Realty Co. v. Miller, 2 N. J. Super. 204, 62 A. 2d 817 (1948) (And
exist whether the fee is in the public or in private owner subject to public easement); 39 C. J. S., Highways § 141.
10 Schiefelbein v. U. S., 124 F. 2d 945 (1942) (P owned triangle of 700 acres,
bounded on two sides by a river. The government straightened the river, thus
completely isolating P's tract, although not trespassing on the tract itself. P's
theory of recovery is in the destruction of the highway leading to his land. Held:
The owner of land has a private property right in a public highway if the only
access to his land is over that highway. A vacation of the highway is a taking
of his property for which he is entitled to compensation. N. B.; The property
taken here is not the land, but the private property of condemnee in the highway.) ; Petition of Burnquist, 220 Minn. 48, 19 N. W. 2d 394 (1945).
" Ridgway v. City of Osceola, 139 Iowa 590, 593, 117 N. W. 974, 975 (1908)
("Where [a] street or alley is necessary to free and convenient access to the
premises of a particular owner, his right to such use is appurtenant to his
premises and cannot be taken away without payment of damages.").
12 People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P. 2d 799 (1943) (Poor Mr. Ricciardi was happy enough until the state chose his locale to create a veritable
nightmare of cloverleafs, under and overpasses, and express, local, and service
lanes. Even his abutter's right to visibility was affected, one state's witness
admitting, "it is my opinion that the view will be sufficiently interfered with so
that anyone desiring to reach Mr. Ricciardi's property will be inclined to lose
his way on account of the circuitous route and fail to reach the property for
that reason." Held: Here there is more than a mere diversion of traffic. There
is a diversion of the highway itself, taking, in effect, his property rights in the
highway.)
1 People v. Sayig, 101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 226 P. 2d 702 (1951) (Construction
of strip dividing highway on which P abuts not compensable although inconvenient.) ; Jones Beach Boulevard Estate v. Robert Moses, 268 N. Y. 362, 197
N. E. 313 (1935) (Reductio ad absurdum: P was abutter on a parkway where
no one was allowed to make a left turn on entering except around "plazas" pro-
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state, having abandoned or vacated a public highway deeds it to a
private owner, there is authority holding that such owner may not
obstruct the road if to do so will substantially hinder other owners'
access to their property.1 4 And the same proposition seems to apply
when the state's highway easement is vacated and the land reverts to
the abutting owners. Even when the state, under its powers of eminent domain, takes an abutter's right of access, the abutter has a cause
of action for compensation for the loss of this vested right whether
the state actually takes his land or not. 15
Suppose, however, a highway is newly located as a Limited Access
highway. Do abutters have any vested rights of access such as would
entitle them to compensation? The few cases that have involved this
question seem to answer it in the negative,' reasoning that there can
be no detriment to a right of easement which never existed and no compensation for a loss never sustained.
A recent Ohio case 17 involves the more intricate problem of the
designation of an existing highway 8 as a limited access highway under
the fairly typical Ohio statute. 19
vided for that purpose. Nearest "plaza" to P is five miles away, therefore, in
order to go to town P had to drive five miles on one side of road to the plaza,
then turn around and come back. Held: Proper and uniform application of police
powers. Once access is given, and abutter is on the highway, he is treated just
as other traveler thereon.)
1" Long et al v. Melton, 218 N. C. 94, 10 S. E. 2d 699 (1940) ; Davis v. Alexander, 202 N. C. 130, 162 S. E. 472 (1932). While the North Carolina court
speaks of a maxim, "Once a highway always a highway," in all-inclusive terms,
the decided cases all deal with hardship situations. In Long v. Melton, supra,
however, three justices dissented, feeling that the majority's view should be
restricted to cases where access is cut off completely. Lindauer v. Hill, - Okla.
262 P. 2d 697 (1953).
" Department of Public Works v. Lanter, 413 Ill. 581, 110 N. E. 2d 179
(1953); Nichols v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 581, 121 N. E. 2d 56 (1954);
City of Norman v. Safeway Stores, 193 Okla. 534, 145 P. 2d 765 (1944)
Shapera v. Allegheny County, 344 Pa. 473, 25 A. 2d 566 (1942).
1" Thus where P
was originally separated from a certain street by an intervening lot, and that lot was condemned by highway commission for use as "freeway," P was held to have acquired no compensable right of access by virtue of
construction of the freeway. Since he had no right of access before the conversion of the street into a freeway, nothing was taken from him by the failure
to give him access when the conversion took place. Compensation in such a case,
said Gibson, C. J., would be a gift rather than damages. Schnider v. State, 38
Cal. 2d 439, 241 (1952). The Schnider case, supra, was cited by the California
court when a limited access highway was constructed where no road had before
existed. Brand, J., stated that the California and United States constitutions
require compensation for the taking of easements only if there are easements to
take. Highway Comm. v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P. 2d 783 (1954). See Rothwell v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 517, 127 N. E. 2d 524 (1955).
1 Rothwell v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 517, 127 N. E. 2d 524 (1955).
"8The case involved a 13.58 mile section of Route 40, also known as the
National Road, which was originally constructed by the War Department with
funds appropriated by Congress. Construction was begun in 1825 and completed in 1837. [Record, p. 12.1
1" OIlO GENERAL COD
§ 1178-21 (Page, 1946) : Which authorizes the director of highways to "lay out, establish . . . regulate . . . 'Limited Access High-
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Petitioners were abutting property owners and brought action to
enjoin the state highway director from designating a 13.58 mile portion
of route 40 as a limited access highway. Petitioners urged that the
state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protection 20 would
be violated in that the state highway director had treated abutters along
this one stretch of highway in six different manners. 21 They contended
also that the words of § 1178-21 Ohio Gen. Code (1946), "access to which
[limited access highway] may be allowed only at highway intersections
designated by the director," mean "access is allowable only at highway
intersections designated by the director." And, finally, that the highway
in question was not "especially designed for through traffic" and therefore did not come within the statutory definition of "Limited Access
22
Highway."
The court of common pleas and the court of appeals held the director had exceeded his authority in that the 13.58 mile portion was not
"especially designed for through traffic" as the statute required, but
rather "was designed to serve all comers1 23 when it was rebuilt in 1949.
The lower courts also held that the equal protection clauses of the Ohio
and federal constitutions were violated in that "persons similarly situated [were not] . . .accorded equal treatment."'

that while the constitution permits classification,2

These courts found

such classification

ways' . . . within this state" in the same manner as he might lay out etc. ordinary highways, and authorizes him to extinguish by purchase, gift, agreement
or condemnation existing easements of access thereto. The director was further
"authorized" to lay out and construct "service highways" to provide access from
areas adjacent to the Limited Access highways. A Limited Access Highway
is defined by the Ohio statute as "a highway especially designed for through
traffic and over which abutting property owners have no easement or right of
access by reason of the fact that their property abuts upon such highway, and
access to which may be allowed only at highway intersections designated by the
director."
"OU. S. CoNsT. Art. XIV, § 1; OHio CoNsT. Art. I, § 2.
21 The court of common pleas found that in two cases no restriction of access
was sought by the Highway Department; in four cases access was restricted
only from part of abutter's property; in five cases all access was excluded, but
eight driveways were constructed onto the highway from these parcels; in five
cases all access was excluded -except for one driveway directly onto the highway
in each deed; in four cases all right of access was excluded and no access provided; and in four cases no restriction of access was imposed. Brief for Appellant, app. II, p. 3, Rothwell v. Linzell, supra note 17.
2 See note 19 .mpra.
2 Brief for Appellant, app. II,
p. 5, Rothwell v. Linzell, note 17, supra.
2 Brief for Appellant, app. II, p. 6, Rothwell v. Linzell, note 17 supra; see
note 21 supra.
2 Thus, an ordinance forbidding trucks from displaying other than their own
advertising because of an alleged tendency to distract other drivers, was held
not violative of equal protection clause because the classification had reference
to the purpose of the regulation. Railway Express Co. v. New York, 336 U. S.
106 (1949). Where the statute permitted retention of already established access,
but forbade new access. Held, not an unjust discrimination; "classification by
which unsuitable conditions are restrained within their existing extent is not
unreasonable." Opinion of the Justices. - N. H. -, 105 A. 2d 924, 926 (1954) ;
cited in Wiseman v. Merrill, N. H. -.
109 A. 2d 42 (1954) (established
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must have some reasonable basis.26 Nor did they concur with the
director's contention that he was given the authority to restrict access
27
in this case under the police power.
On appeal the Ohio Supreme Court, Taft, J., reversed. Taking as
his text the words of the statute, he held the words in the definition
of a limited access highway, "access to which may be allowed only at
28
highway intersections designated by the director," to be permissive,
simply showing "the extent to which rights of access to a limited access
highway might be curtailed or eliminated." Continuing, Justice Taft
paused to observe "considerable weight" should be given an administrative determination by the highway director that a highway was
"especially designed" 2 as a limited access highway, and clinched his
rationale for holding the director to be within his statutory authority
by noting, "It is obviously not necessary that a highway be designed
'exclusively' for through traffic in order to be 'especially' designed for
through traffic."
Nor did the supreme court find that the director was required to
construct "service highways" to provide access at the designated intersections for abutters whose access to the highway had been acquired
or condemned. They left these decisions, as well as the deciding of
whose access rights are to be acquired, to the discretion of the director.
The question of equal protection received short shrift: the court
stated that such a question can obviously be raised only where the
extinguishment of access is by condemnation. For such a loss, the
owner is entitled to compensation for decrease in value of his property. 30
businesses allowed to retain access.); Jones Beach Blvd. Estate v. Moses, 268
N. Y. 362, 197 N. E. 313 (1935) ; Suddreth v. Charlotte, 223 N. C. 630, 633, 27
S. E. 2d 650, 653 (1943) (Barnhill, J.: "The discriminations which invalidate

an ordinance are those where persons [in the same class] are subjected to different restrictions or are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions.").
- And here there was nothing on the record indicating a reasonable basis for
discrimination. Brief of Appellant, app. II, p. 7.
" Breinig v. County of Allegheny, 32 Pa. 474, 2 A. 2d 842 (1938) (Use of
police power by public authority must be reasonable and not capricious or arbitrary.) ; but see Department of Public Works v. Lanter, 413 Ill. 581, 110 N. E.
2d 179, 183 (1953) ; Note 60 HARv. L. REv. 464 (1947).
28 Compare this construction with that in Supervisors v. U. S. ex relatione,
71 U. S. 435, 446, 18 L. Ed. 419, 423 (1866) ; where Swayne, J., states, "Where
power is given to public officers, in the language of the act before us ["may"]
or in equivalent language-whenever the public interest or individual rights call
for its exercise-the language used, though permissive in form, is in fact peremptory." Which view seems rather general; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, p. 1131
(4th ed. 1951). Compare also ORE. LAWS 1947, c. 226 § 14 ("the commission
shall provide access . . ." [Emphasis supplied.]).
-, See note 19 supra.
20 U. S. v. Miller, 317 U. S. 329 (1942).
(In ascertaining damages it is not
proper to take into account an enhancement in value.); Department of Public
Works v. Thompson, 43 Cal. 2d 13, 271 P. 2d 507 (1954) (compensation for
severance.) ; In Re Appropriation of Easement for Highway Purposes, 93 Ohio
App. 179, 112 N. E. 2d 411 (1952) (Court here lists elements of establishing
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Thus, in such cases, petitioners are not in the position of parties whose
property rights have been interfered with under the exercise of the
power of taxation or the police power, in which cases there would be
no compensation. Finally, to the petitioners' contentions that the
director did not treat similarly abutters similarly located, the Ohio
court laconically announced that "the mere fact, if it is a fact, that
the director has failed to perform some duties, is no reason for enjoining him from performing other duties that he is undertaking to perform."
This writer submits that the Ohio court by permitting this public
officer to decide for himself what duties to perform and what duties
not to perform, when coupled with his discretion in selecting sites and
otherwise, may well allow him, subject only to expensive and tedious
litigation, to designate by a simple entry in his journal long-established
highways as limited access highways, and then by a majestic stroke
of his pen to strike off the access of the abutting landowners at will;
perhaps because the color of their hair is not pleasing to him, perhaps
because their politics are not pleasing to him. Such is not yet the
prevailing view of "equal protection."
If North Carolina ever sees fit to enact a limited access highway
statute, we would be well advised to avoid such a wholesale grant of
power to the highway department. Peterson, J., dissenting in the
Burnquist case 8' stated the danger succinctly: "the .. .object of the
trunk highway system ... was to get the farmers out of the mud. To
the extent that the commissioner can exercise the power here asserted
he not only can keep them in the mud, but off the highways altogether."
But if the statutory discretion which the Ohio court seems to have
vested in their highway director appears to be overly broad, the North
Carolina situation is even more unwarranted. This writer can find
no authority whatever for the North Carolina highway commissioner
to designate public highways as limited access ways. In fact, the highway department received a negative mandate in 1951 when that legislature expressly refused to pass legislation 2 authorizing limited access
highways. Yet, offering no explanation,83 the North Carolina highway
severance damages as; 1. The fair market value of the property taken, 2. The
reduced value of the residue, to be determined after severance and without deduction for benefits.); Highway Commission v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 265 P. 2d
783 (1954) (Methods of apportionment of award for loss of access between
lessor and lessee.) ; Wis L. Rav. 458 (1953) ; See note 7 and 8 supra.

Petition of Burnquist, 220 Minn. 48, 19 N. W. 2d 394, 413 (1945).
H. B. 569, "...an act to provide for the.. . establishment... of limited-access
facilities ... " was introduced in the 1951 North Carolina Legislature, but reported
21
12

unfavorably in the Senate.

"Or, at least, has offered no explanation to this reviewer, who sent to their

General Counsel by registered mail (September 26, 1955; registered no 729,
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department is busily putting limited access signs on many of our newer
highways. 34 Either the highway department is proceeding under a conviction that power to designate limited access highways is implied in
the general grant of powers to that department, a conviction which
hardly seems tenable, when we consider our court's traditional solicitude for individual rights,35 or the North Carolina highway department
is making an attempt to bluff abutters into a belief that they have lost
rights which have, in fact, always been theirs. Let us hope that if these
acts are tested in the courts, as they should be, the commission will
be able to offer convincing evidence of its authority to designate Limited
Access Highways in North Carolina.
HAMILTON C. HORTON, JR.
Torts-Contributory Negligence as a Matter of Law-A Threat to
Stare Decisis
In broad daylight the plaintiff-pedestrian, who had looked both
ways and had seen no vehicle approaching, started across the open
highway and was struck by defendant-motorist eighteen inches from the
other side; the motorist was traveling only twenty to twenty-five miles
per hour and the plaintiff had clear visibility for 700 feet. The Supreme
Court reversed the judgment for the plaintiff on the ground that he
was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.' Judge Bobbitt, dissenting, 2 thought that there was more reason for submitting this case
to the jury than there was in the similar case of Williams v. Henderson,3 because more evidence of due care was shown here. The principal
case attempted to distinguish the Williams case, 4 but did not seem to
Chapel Hill.) an inquiry as to the authority under which the Commission was
constructing Limited Access Highways.
"Typical are those erected on the Durham-Chapel Hill highway: "Limited
Access Highway.

Entrance by permit only.

S. H. & P. W. C."

"The Minnesota Court, in Petition of Burnquist, 220 Minn. 48, 19 N. W. 2d
394 (1945), reviews the question of whether statutory authority is necessary
and tabulates those states which are with and those without statutes. That
court found a statute unnecessary, construing the general grant of power to determine what "land" to acquire, to include all interests growing out of land,
including easements of access. The great majority of states, however, obviously
felt a specific statute necessary: e.g., ILLINOIS ANNO. STAT. c. 121 § 334 et seq.
(Supp. 1954); ANNO. LAWS OF MASS. C. 81 § 7c (1953); N. Y. CODE ANNO.
c. 248 § 30.4 (1937); OHio GEN. CODE § 1178-21 (Page 1946); ORE. LAws

c. 226 § 14 (1947).

'Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N. C. 412, 85 S. E. 2d 589 (1954).
2
Id. at 418, 85 S.E. 2d at 593.
8230 N. C. 707, 55 S.E. 2d 462 (1949). Plaintiff's intestate crossed the open
highway to go to her mail box. As she was standing at the box with her back
to the road two trucks were approaching, the second following the first at a short
distance. The first truck passed and she turned suddenly and walked in front
of the second truck. The court held that intestate was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
'Garmon v. Thomas, 241 N. C. 412, 416, 85 S. E. 2d 589, 592: "'Here the

